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Abstract In Uganda, a low-income country in east Africa,
African swine fever (ASF) is endemic with yearly outbreaks.
In the prevailing smallholder subsistence farming systems,
farm biosecurity is largely non-existent. Outbreaks of ASF,
particularly in smallholder farms, often go unreported, creat-
ing significant epidemiological knowledge gaps. The contin-
uous circulation of ASF in smallholder settings also creates
biosecurity challenges for larger farms. In this study, an on-
going outbreak of ASF in an endemic area was investigated on
farm level, including analyses of on-farm environmental virus
contamination. The study was carried out on a medium-sized
pig farm with 35 adult pigs and 103 piglets or growers at the
onset of the outbreak. Within 3 months, all pigs had died or
were slaughtered. The study included interviews with farm
representatives as well as biological and environmental sam-
pling. ASF was confirmed by the presence of ASF virus
(ASFV) genomic material in biological (blood, serum) and
environmental (soil, water, feed, manure) samples by real-
time PCR. The ASFV-positive biological samples confirmed
the clinical assessment and were consistent with known virus
characteristics. Most environmental samples were found to be
positive. Assessment of farm biosecurity, interviews, and the
results from the biological and environmental samples
revealed that breaches and non-compliance with biosecurity
protocols most likely led to the introduction and within-farm
spread of the virus. The information derived from this study
provides valuable insight regarding the implementation of
biosecurity measures, particularly in endemic areas.
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Introduction
African swine fever (ASF) was first observed and described in
pigs of European settlers (Sus scrofa) in Kenya in the begin-
ning of the twentieth century (Montgomery 1921). Close to a
century later, the disease is present in most pig-keeping areas
on the African continent (Penrith and Vosloo 2009). ASF is a
contagious, typically lethal, hemorrhagic disease of domestic
pigs caused by a double-stranded DNAvirus, the sole member
within the Asfarviridae family, genus Asfivirus (Plowright
et al. 1994). A common clinical presentation in sub-Saharan
Africa is peracute or acute hemorrhagic fever with almost
100% case fatality rate (Plowright et al. 1994). The epidemi-
ology is complex with a sylvatic cycle involving asymptom-
atically infected warthogs and soft ticks, a domestic cycle
involving soft ticks and domestic pigs, and an additional do-
mestic cycle with pig-to-pig transmission (Costard et al. 2013;
Jori et al. 2013). The latter transmission cycle has been iden-
tified as the main driver of disease in areas with a high density
of pigs, mainly free-range systems, and a low level of farm
biosecurity such as in sub-Saharan Africa (Penrith et al. 2013).
ASF has severe economic impacts, both in high- and low-
income countries (Sanchez-Vizcaino et al. 2013; Mur et al.
2014; Chenais et al. 2015a), and its control is essential for
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profitable pig production. Achieving control is complicated as
ASF virus (ASFV) may remain viable for long periods in
infected pig tissues, meat, and processed pig products, and
by the lack of an effective vaccine. However, it has been
shown that control can be realized through strict compartmen-
talization separating domestic pigs from the sylvatic hosts and
by targeted biosecurity (Penrith and Vosloo 2009).
InUganda, a low-income country in sub-SaharanAfrica, ASF
is endemic. The presence of ASFV in the sylvatic cycle is prob-
ably as ancient as in other areas of the region (Montgomery
1921; Plowright et al. 1994), but with a growing domestic pig
population, numerous outbreaks are now described every year
(Gallardo et al. 2011;Muwonge et al. 2012; Atuhaire et al. 2013;
Barongo et al. 2015; Chenais et al. 2015b; Muhangi et al. 2015).
The Ugandan pig population is the largest in East Africa
(FAOSTAT 2013), but larger-scale enterprises are rare and most
of the pigs are still kept in smallholder family farms in the rural
areas (NEPAD and FAO 2004; Dione et al. 2014).
In the smallholder subsistence farming systems that
dominate in low-income countries such as Uganda, farm
biosecurity is practically non-existent (Costard et al.
2009a; Fasina et al. 2012; Dione et al. 2015; Leslie
et al. 2015; Nantima et al. 2016). The majority of pigs
roam freely at least parts of the year, and even if an
enclosure for the pigs is available, animals are frequently
found outside the pens (Dione et al. 2014; Ikwap et al.
2014; Chenais et al. 2015a). As the pigs are not con-
fined, restriction of visitor’s access to the animals,
change of clothing and boots, insect and rodent control,
quarantine of new animals, environmental, feed, and wa-
ter hygiene or any other biosecurity measures become
difficult to achieve (Young et al. 2013; Dione et al.
2015). Poverty prevents even simple investments and
promotes utilization of all animal protein. The conse-
quences are consumption of meat from animals that have
died or been slaughtered upon showing signs of disease,
and trade in sick animals or animals that have been in
contact with sick animals (Chenais et al. 2015a; Leslie
et al. 2015; Nantima et al. 2016). The lack of biosecurity
and related continuous circulation of ASF in smallholder
settings in endemic areas thus creates a biosecurity chal-
lenge for enterprises that aspire at larger-scale pig farm-
ing in these areas. In smallholder settings in endemic
areas, outbreaks of ASF, like other diseases, are largely
under-reported (de Balogh et al. 2013; Chenais et al.
2015a; Nantima et al. 2015). As a consequence, the pro-
gression of outbreaks and the related impacts are seldom
described in detail. In order to attempt control of ASF,
epidemiological knowledge is needed on the global, na-
tional, regional, and local scale, including individual out-
breaks, i.e., on farm level (FAO 2014). If larger-scale pig
farming in ASF-endemic areas in resource-poor settings
such as sub-Saharan Africa are to succeed, these
knowledge gaps need to be filled and the associated spe-
cific challenges better understood.
The objective of this study was to investigate and describe
an outbreak of ASF on farm level in an endemic area, includ-
ing investigations of the on-farm environmental virus contam-
ination during the outbreak. Based on this, we discuss chal-
lenges facing pig farming in endemic areas, with special em-
phasis on farm-level biosecurity.
Materials and methods
The study was carried out on a pig farm in Lira district in
northern Uganda in March, April, and September 2014.
Study area
Lira district, in northern Uganda, has a human population of
about 400,000 and covers approximately 3500 km2 of land
(UBOS 2014). Since the civil conflict between 1987 and
2007, the human population is heavily concentrated in Lira
town (Jacobsen et al. 2006). The most recent livestock census
dates from 2008, and at that time, the district held 28,630 pigs
(UBOS 2008). Since then, all indications are that the number
of pigs has increased.
Study farm
The study farm was run by a non-governmental organization
(NGO) and established to financially support the organiza-
tion’s humanitarian activities. The objective of the farm was
to produce piglets and pork and in addition to offer training in
pig husbandry for local pig farmers. As such, the farm repre-
sented a larger-scale farming operation located in an area with
typical smallholder family farms, thus vulnerable to the vari-
ous challenges, including biosecurity, facing a pig farm in an
ASF-endemic setting.
The farm started breeding pigs in 2013. In January 2014,
the farm had 35 adult pigs and 103 piglets and growers, all of
exotic (typical European white landrace) breed. The pigs were
kept in a purpose-built, fenced compound with two stables.
One stable was made entirely of concrete with a tin roof
(Bconcrete stable^), and one had concrete floors, tinned roof,
and pen walls of wooden planks with gaps between the planks
allowing nose-to-nose contact (Bwood fence stable^). The
compound also contained additional buildings for office, stor-
age, and guards and an unfinished construction with a cement
slab (see Fig. 1). After slaughter, the meat was transported to
the office of the NGO for storage, sale, or consumption. At the
end of January 2014, the farm started selling and slaughtering
the first animals. In the first week of March 2014, the authors
were contacted concerning disease and mortalities in the pigs.
Already at this stage, ASF was suggested based on the clinical
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signs and the location in northern Uganda, and some prelim-
inary advice to contain the disease and prevent further spread
was given.
Data and sample collection
The study included five farm visits (11th of March, 23rd of
March, 2nd of April, 10th of April, and 21st of September
2014) comprising interviews with farm representatives, site
assessment, and the collection of biological and environmen-
tal samples. Interviews were informal, with simultaneous
note-taking. Photographs were taken as part of the assessment,
and feedback in the form of investigation reports were provid-
ed to farm representatives following each visit. Information
regarding biosecurity was extracted from the interview data
and from observations made during the farm visits.
Biological samples were collected on the 11th of March
and 10th of April 2014 (see Table 1). Blood and serum were
obtained by puncture of the jugular vein using a vacutainer
system. Organ samples were obtained from the carcass of one
animal. Five to ten grams of material was collected from the
liver, kidney, spleen, and lung, respectively, and put in sepa-
rate, disposable plastic containers.
Environmental samples were taken on the 2nd of April
2014. Places to be sampled were chosen based on visible
blood contamination and from interviews indicating
biosecurity high-risk spots. Sample material was in most cases
soil with some samples of feed, water, manure, or pig hair
(Table 2). Each sample consisted of approximately 15–30 cl
of material. One pair of disposable gloves and one disposable
spoon were used for each sample. Samples were put in indi-
vidual disposable plastic containers.
Biological samples were stored overnight in a fridge at the
district veterinary office in the neighboring Gulu district be-
fore transport. Environmental samples were transported di-
rectly to the laboratory at Makerere University in Kampala.
During transport, samples were kept cool with ice in a cooler
bag. On arrival to the laboratory, serum samples were centri-
fuged and sera separated. Serum, blood, and environmental
samples were stored at −20 °C until further processing.
Laboratory investigations
Laboratory analyses were done at the Molecular Biology
Laboratory at Makerere University, in Kampala, and the na-
tional reference laboratory, National Animal Disease
Diagnostics and Epidemiology Centre in Entebbe. DNA ex-
traction of biological samples was done either by DNeasy
Blood and Tissue kit (QIAGEN AG, Hombrechtikon,
Switzerland) (samples from the 11th of March) or by a
MagMAX kit (Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc., Waltham, MA,
USA) (samples from the 10th of April), according to the
Fig. 1 Approximate plan of the
study farm indicating sites where
environmental samples were
taken during a confirmed African
swine fever outbreak in a
medium-sized farm in Lira
district, Uganda. Lettered squares
mark the different buildings, light
gray areas indicate sites used for
placing carcasses awaiting burial,
and burial of carcasses, and dark
gray areas mark sites used for
bleeding pigs at slaughter. The
dotted area outlines the overflow
from a septic tank. Numbersmark
environmental samples (1–35)
taken on the 2nd of April 2014.
Compound size: around
40 × 60 m. A latrines; B septic
tanks; C concrete pig stables, 10
pens; D wood fence pig stables, 3
pens; E first slaughter place,
wood structure; F latter slaughter
place, concrete slab;G offices and
storage
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Table 2 Environmental samples taken on the 2nd of April 2014 on a medium-sized farm in Lira district, Uganda, and analyzed for the presence of
African swine fever virus nuclear acids
Sample number Material Location/description Result PCR
1–3 Soil In front of the concrete construction used for slaughter +
4–6 Soil Site where blood have been buried +
7–8 Soil Burial ground +
9 Hair/other remains On wooden structure previously used as slaughter slab +
10–11 Soil and hair Under wooden structure previously used as slaughter slab, partly burnt +
12 Soil Original placement of wooden structure previously used as slaughter slab +
13 Soil On the ground outside pen no. 12, cleaning water overflow at this point +
14 Soil On the ground outside pen no. 13, cleaning water overflow at this point +
15–19 Soil/manure Overflow from septic tank +
20 Water/feed Cleaning water from outdoor pens +
21–24 Soil Burial ground between latrines/fence/septic tank +
25 Soil Burial ground between latrines/fence/septic tank −
26 Soil Outside cement pig stable, next to disinfection foot bath, Bentrance^ +
27 Soil Under a dead pig on burial ground −
28–29 Soil Outside cement pig stable, next to disinfection foot bath, Bexit^ +
30 Soil Between concrete and outdoor pens +
31 Soil Location where pigs have been bled at slaughter +
32 Soil Location where pigs have been bled at slaughter +
33 Soil Location where pigs have been bled at slaughter +
34 Soil Location where pigs have been bled at slaughter +
35 Soil Location where pigs have been bled at slaughter +
Table 1 Biological samples taken on the 11th March and 10th April
2014 on a medium-sized farm in Lira district, Uganda, and analyzed for
the presence of African swine fever virus nuclear acids (samples from the
11th of March) or African swine fever virus nuclear acids and ASF anti-



























1 AH blood 1 3 months F - 1 AH blood 1 4 months F + -
2 AH blood 1 3 months F -
3 AH blood 1 3 months F -
4 AH blood 2 12 months F -
5 AH blood 2 12 months F -
6 AH blood 2 8 months F -
7 AH blood 8 12 months F -
8 AH blood 8 12 months F -
9 AH blood 6 8 months M -
10 AH blood 6 12 months F -
11 AH blood 7 3 months M -
12 AH blood 7 3 months M - 12 AH blood 7 4 months M - -
13 AH blood 9 12 months F - 13 AH blood 9 13 months F - -
14 AH blood 9 12 months M -
15 AH blood 10 2 months F -
16 AH blood 10 2 months M -
17 AH blood 11 12 months M -
18 AH blood 11 12 months F -
19 Dead organ 10 NA NA +
20 AH blood 1 4 months F - -
22 CD blood 10 3 months M + -
23 CD blood 10 3 months M + -
24 CD blood 10 3 months M - +
25 AH blood 4 3 months M - -
26 AH blood 7 4 months M - -
27 AH blood 7 4 months M - -
28 CD blood 5 12 months F + +
29 CD blood 12 2 months M - -
30 CD blood 12 2 months F - -
31 CD blood 12 2 months F - -
Samples with positive results for either test are marked in pink
NA data not available, AH apparently healthy, CD clinically diseased, LFD lateral flow device
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instructions of the manufacturers. All organ material was
pooled before DNA extraction. The extractions from the
11th of March were analyzed for the presence of ASFV
nucleic acids using a commercially available real-time PCR
assay (Tetracore ASFV; Tetracore Inc., Rockville, MD, USA)
according to the instructions of the manufacturer. The extrac-
tions from the 10th of April were analyzed for the presence of
ASFV nucleic acids with a Universal Probe Library (UPL)
probe (5′-FAM-GGCCAGGA-dark quencher-3′) (Roche
Diagnostics, Rotkreuz, Switzerland) as previously described
(Fernandez-Pinero et al. 2013). DNA from the environmental
samples was extracted using the PowerLyzer® PowerSoil®
DNA Isolation Kit (MO BIO Laboratories Inc., Carlsbad, CA,
USA) in accordance with the instructions of the manufacturer.
The DNA extractions of the environmental samples were an-
alyzed for the presence of ASFV nucleic acids using a com-
mercially available real-time PCR assay with internal control
(IC) (Tetracore ASFV; Tetracore Inc., Rockville, MD, USA)
in accordance with the instructions of the manufacturer.
Blood samples taken on the 10th of April were also tested
for the presence of ASF antibodies using a lateral-flow device




The outbreak became apparent on the 7th of March 2014 with
an adult boar presenting with shivering, fever (40.8 °C), and
anorexia (Table 3). The boar had escaped from its pen into the
yard 6 days earlier. The next day, two sows aborted, and one of
them plus the aforementioned boar died. The other sow died
the day after. The following days, a few pigs died each day,
most of them adult pigs. Between days 10 and 16 of the out-
break, many piglets/growers died, and the cumulative death
figures started to show signs of exponential growth (see
Fig. 2). On the 34th day of the outbreak, 133 pigs had either
died or been slaughtered upon showing clinical signs of ASF.
Three months after the onset of the outbreak, all pigs at the
farm had either died or been slaughtered and the farm was
empty.
Laboratory investigations
A DNA extraction of the pooled organ samples from one
dead pig from the 11th of March was positive for the
presence of ASFV. All 18 DNA extractions of blood
samples from the 11th of March were negative for the
presence of ASFV. Five DNA extractions of blood sam-
ples from the 10th of April were positive for ASFV. One
of these ASFV-positive samples was also positive for the
presence of ASF antibodies, as was one of the ASFV-
negative samples. See Table 1 for details of the results of
analyses of biological samples and the clinical status of
the sampled pigs. Out of 35 DNA extractions of the
environmental samples, 33 were positive for the presence
of ASFV (Table 2).
Biosecurity challenges
The first impression of the farm setup was that the farm
seemed to comply with rather high biosecurity standards
and to be fit for pig farming in an ASF-endemic area. The
fenced and guarded compound, staff wearing overalls and
rubber boots, and pigs confined in pens and fed only con-
centrate feed contributed to this impression. However, the
interviews and more in-depth assessment of the farm site
revealed that biosecurity standards were lacking, including
routines as well as the layout and location of specific ac-
tivities. Specific biosecurity risks are described in more
detail below.
Table 3 Temporal description of a confirmed African swine fever







7th March 0 First pig shows clinical signs:
fever, shivering, anorexia
0
8th March 1 First pig dies, 2 sows abort, 1
of these dies
2
9th March 2 Second sow that aborted the
day before dies
3
10th March 3 Fourth adult pig dies 4
11th March 4 First piglet/grower dies 5
12th March 5 2 growers die 7
16th March 9 2 adult pig show clinical signs,
both slaughtered
9
17th March 10 1 adult pig dies, 3 adult pigs
start showing clinical signs,
all 3 slaughtered
13
23rd March 16 In total 15 adult pigs have died,




2nd April 26 Since the 23rd of March, 4
adult pigs have died, 8 adult
pigs have been slaughtered,
and 16 piglets/growers have
died
78
10th April 34 Since the 2nd of April, 54
piglets/growers and 1 adult
pig have died
133
June All pigs dead or slaughtered >138
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Slaughter
The slaughter took place inside the compound, less than
3 m from the wood fence stable, with no drainage and on
an unpaved surface (see Fig. 1). During the outbreak,
adult pigs and growers were slaughtered upon showing
signs of disease in order not to lose the entire value of
the pig. At slaughter, pigs were stunned with a gun and
the throat was cut when the animal was lying on the
ground. Excess blood was directed towards an excavated
hole at the slaughter site and buried together with the
offal. After slaughter, the carcasses were placed on a
wooden structure during evisceration, cleaning, and
butchering. Water was used to wash the carcasses, but
there was no system for collecting this water. After the
visit on the 23rd of March, slaughter was moved to the
concrete slab (see Fig. 1). At the visit on the 23rd of
March and 2nd of April, pieces of meat and pig hair
could be found on the ground around the slaughter sites,
demonstrating a lack of appropriate hygiene standards.
The slaughter was performed by the same personnel that
tended to the pigs. After the beginning of the outbreak,
overalls were changed and boots were cleaned and put in
the disinfection boot bath between slaughter and tending
to live pigs.
Personnel
At the visit on the 11th of March, four different staff members
tended to the pigs, including the guards. There had been a high
turnover of staff with four farm workers leaving in the previ-
ous 6 months, causing biosecurity routines to be lost in the
transition process. During the course of the outbreak, the man-
ager quit his position, leaving only less experienced personnel
behind. According to the routines, rubber boots and overalls
were provided for the staff and overalls were washed daily.
Despite the stated routines, it was apparent that procedures
were not being followed, as some personnel were not using
overalls at the visit on the 23rd of March.
Water management
Pig pens were cleaned with a water hose and the cleaning
water tunneled towards the manure tank. Part of the water
from cleaning of the wood-fence stable was flowing on the
ground along the side of the stables. The manure tank was
overflowing, creating a manure-filled ditch close to the fence
at one side of the compound (see Fig. 1).
Pig records and movements
Pigs were not individually marked, and prior to the outbreak,
no records were kept. Pigs that fell sick during the outbreak
were in general not euthanized or slaughtered immediately but
left in the pen, or moved to pens with other sick pigs. Dead
pigs were buried within the compound, and while awaiting
burial, they were left on the ground for several hours.
During cleaning of the pens, pigs sometimes escaped into
the yard where they had access to the slaughter site and the
overflow from the manure tank.
Stable hygiene
When the outbreak started, disinfectant boot baths were
placed at both entrances to the concrete stable and at the gate
to the compound. After the visit on the 11th of March, a
commercial disinfectant with ammonium chloride as the ac-
tive ingredient was used. However, the boot baths were placed
on an unpaved surface and used without prior cleaning of the
boots, causing contamination of the water by organic material.
In both sites, the boot baths were placed without any demar-
cation of the Bclean^ and the Bdirty^ side. General cleaning of
the pens seemed to be insufficient as material from an abortion
was found in a pen at the visit on the 23rd of March.
Other
Offal from slaughter and dead pigs was buried in a rather
limited area of the compound. As the number of deaths and
Fig. 2 Accumulated number of
dead and slaughtered pigs during
a confirmed African swine fever
outbreak in a medium-sized farm
in Lira district, Uganda
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the related slaughter of sick pigs increased, the risk from these
burials (digging in already used plots and the resurfacing of
still active ASFV) increased. In January 2014, 2 months prior
to the outbreak, the closest neighbors of the farm, just adjacent
to the fence, opened a pork joint (in Uganda—a restaurant
specialized in roasting pork) with on-site slaughter. Offal from
slaughter at the pork joint was left in the open.
Social and economic impacts and challenges
Before the outbreak, the farm employed two farm workers,
two guards, and a farm manager. At the visits on the 23rd of
March and the 2nd of April, the farm manager expressed feel-
ings of deep stress and depression from seeing the pigs getting
sick and die and not being able to control the outbreak. At the
visit on the 10th of April, the farm manager had left his posi-
tion without giving notice to the employer. On the visit of the
21st of September, the farm representative reported that he had
considered leaving his position because of similar feelings of
stress and depression connected to the outbreak. Apart from
the farmmanager who left his post voluntarily, two staff mem-
bers lost their job due to the outbreak as no farm labor was
needed once all pigs had died. The staff at the NGO’s main
office also expressed worries that they might lose their em-
ployment due to the financial impacts of the outbreak.
In total, 35 adult pigs and more than a hundred piglets or
growers died or were slaughtered with clinical symptoms of
ASF during the outbreak. The farm estimated the market value
of a pig at slaughter to 90 USD. The full value of all pigs were
not lost as some were slaughtered. Further, the planned in-
come was reduced by more than the slaughter value of the
herd pre-outbreak, as a fourth of the original herd was breed-
ing stock not meant for slaughter and representing a higher
value. The farm estimated the total loss (including costs for re-
stocking, de-contamination, repair, and extra work, but ex-
cluding the gain made from slaughter during the outbreak) at
approximately 20,000 USD.
Discussion
The results from the outbreak investigations correspond to the
pathogenesis and survival features of ASFV. The virus can be
found in a wide range of tissues and secretions, including
feces and urine, from clinically affected pigs (Greig and
Plowright 1970; Plowright et al. 1994; Davies et al. 2015).
The highest viral loads are found in blood (Blome et al.
2013). Virus can be isolated from blood and organs before
the pigs show any clinical signs (Gallardo et al. 2015). Feces
has been shown to remain infectious for 1 week, even longer if
kept dark (Montgomery 1921; Davies et al. 2015). However,
ASFV is quickly inactivated in slurry (Turner et al. 1999). In
African conditions, virus that is unprotected by organic
material is inactivated within a couple of days if exposed to
sunlight (Montgomery 1921). Based on the known physiolo-
gy of the virus, following the initial introduction onto the
farm, several routines observed in this study constituted a high
risk for sustaining the outbreak within the farm. The presence
of ASFV nucleic acids at various sites and in various environ-
mental specimens (soil, water, feed, pig hair, manure) demon-
strates the high level of contamination that occurred and the
failure of the biosecurity routines that were employed.
The source of ASF introduction was never determined.
One possible source could be infected offal or pork from the
neighboring pork joint, brought into the farm by birds, ro-
dents, or humans. The fact that the primary case had escaped
into the yard some days before disease onset indicates the
presence of virus in the yard. The high staff turnover, com-
bined with a lack of external biosecurity, were other risk fac-
tors for introduction of ASF. Staff may have had pigs of their
own at home, or in their villages, allowing for indirect virus
transmission via, e.g., shoes. Prior to the outbreak, boot baths
were not used. Rubber boots were provided for the farm
workers, but as no biosecurity barrier with change of boots
protocol was in place, ASFV could easily have been brought
in by any farmworker, vehicle, or visitor. Boot baths that were
put in place after the start of the outbreak were most probably
ineffective due to contamination with organic material (Amass
et al. 2000). In order for boot baths to be effective, boots need
to be cleaned from organic material prior to disinfection and to
rest in the boot bath between 2 and 5 min (depending on
disinfectant used) (Amass et al. 2000; Amass and Ragland
2001). A change of boots is a safer, quicker, more environ-
mentally friendly, and also cheaper (the cost of a pair of rubber
boots in Uganda is approximately 5 USD) alternative than
boot baths.
The process of slaughtering inside the compound consti-
tutes a very high biosecurity risk. In this case, the risk
pertained not only to slaughter in immediate proximity to
the pigs but also to the fact that slaughter was performed on
a soft surface without drainage and with no way to safely
dispose of offal. Moreover, the same staff took care of the live
pigs and performed the slaughter. This represents a biosecurity
failure in both infrastructure and protocols. A safe slaughter
process in general, and even more importantly when slaughter
takes place in close connection with pig farming, requires a
strict one-way flow from the dirty (live pigs) to the clean
(meat) side (Skaarup 1985). No equipment, animals, or per-
sonnel must move from the dirty to the clean side, and no
movement back to live pigs from neither clean nor dirty side
can be allowed. Facilities and equipment that are easily
cleaned, proper drainage, and safe disposal of offal, blood,
and water from the slaughter process are essential for manag-
ing the risk of transmission of many pathogens (Skaarup
1985). Performing safe slaughter within a pig farming com-
pound in an ASF-endemic area is very challenging and
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requires extremely strict biosecurity routines in order to re-
duce the biosecurity risks to acceptable levels.
In the described outbreak, most pigs had died within a
month and all pigs had died or been slaughtered within
three months. Farm records did not allow full distinction be-
tween pigs that died by themselves from the disease, those
slaughtered upon showing clinical signs, or those slaughtered
as a preventive action to avoid losses. The time to clearance of
the outbreak (meaning no infectious animals or virus are left
on the farm), however, matched recent simulations on the
spread of ASF on farm level for pig herds of the same size,
based on the ASFV strain from Georgia (Halasa et al. 2016).
In the model developed by Halasa et al. (2016), time to clear-
ance is significantly correlated to herd size and, depending on
variables, related to the transmission rate per day as well as the
infectiousness of residues of dead animals and of subclinically
infected animals. The infectiousness of material and infected
animals will not be different in this setting compared to other
outbreaks, but the breaches in biosecurity would affect the
outcome as the pigs in this farm had higher levels of exposure
to both residues of dead animals and blood from subclinically
infected animals (via regrouping of animals, slaughter, burial)
than in most settings. The extensive environmental contami-
nation further supports this assumption.
The farm manager’s expressed feelings of stress and de-
pression during the outbreak could have been one of the rea-
sons behind the habit of not immediately euthanizing or
slaughtering pigs that fell ill. The farm manager stated that
he did not euthanize sick pigs Bbecause they might recover.^
Healthy pigs were further put together in pens called
Bisolation units^ and sick pigs put together in other pens. As
pigs were not individually marked, this routine made the
tracking of cases more difficult and, in addition, probably
contributed to disease transmission. It is worth mentioning
that standard disease control advice such as isolating sick pigs
will be useless, or even counterproductive, if implemented
when disease transmission has already started. In order for
managers to make correct decisions in outbreak situations,
they need knowledge about disease transmission and infec-
tion. The case fatality rate after infection with highly virulent
ASFV, such as the genotype IX circulating in Uganda, is very
high (Plowright et al. 1994; Gallardo et al. 2011; Chenais et al.
2015b), and the highest viral loads are observed when pigs
express clinical signs (Davies et al. 2015). Thus, early eutha-
nasia or safe slaughter must be considered key for reducing
disease transmission and the total amount of virus in circula-
tion. Given the local situation with widespread poverty and
related protein deficiency, and considering that ASF is not a
zoonotic disease, the authors argue that legal, safe emergency
slaughter of selected animals would be a better alternative
(Thomson et al. 2004; Naziri et al. 2015) than the current
common practice of panic sales and illegal slaughter
(Chenais et al. 2015a; Leslie et al. 2015; Nantima et al.
2016). In addition, the infectiousness of ASF (measured as
R0) is not extremely high; Guinat et al. (2014) describes low
to moderate transmissibility between pigs. This means that
transmission can be interrupted if strict biosecurity, including
the immediate removal of all infectious pigs, is exercised.
The continuous circulation and frequent outbreaks of ASF
in the smallholder pig sector in Uganda impact negatively on
the livelihoods of poor smallholders (Fasina et al. 2012;
Chenais et al. 2015a). However, the results of this study
showed that such impacts are not restricted to smallholders
only. The study farm did not only suffer substantial economic
loss but aspirations and non-financial investments were also
shattered. As the study farm was meant to serve as a teaching
farm, the failure regarding the loss of the stock and to control
the disease could also have a larger impact on the society. This
was further accentuated as the study farm was meant to fi-
nance the humanitarian activities of the NGO.
In order to achieve ASF control globally, nationally, and
locally, many different aspects of the epidemiology need to be
considered (Costard et al. 2009b). One important piece of the
puzzle is biosecurity advice that is successfully implemented
in the local context (Coffin et al. 2015). The authors consider
simplicity, adaptability, acceptance, and cost-effectiveness to
be vital for success in this regard. One example is the practice
of slaughter and sale of sick pigs, as mentioned above
(Chenais et al. 2015a; Leslie et al. 2015; Nantima et al.
2016). As these practices are common, they need to be con-
sidered while formulating disease control information. The
fact that this practices violates national animal health laws
and regulations should not automatically cause this line of
enquiry to be dismissed (Leach and Scoones 2013; Coffin
et al. 2015). If such regulations are unenforceable and coun-
terproductive, then changes in policy should be investigated.
Another example from the present study of adoption of
biosecurity advice to the local context is the simple recom-
mendation to implement biosecurity barriers with the associ-
ated change of boots instead of disinfectant boot baths. The
larger context in which the pig farms exist cannot be
neglected. Poverty will have a strong impact on the feasibility
of biosecurity routines, the education level of employees, as
well as the employer’s ability to maintain working conditions
that favor stability and compliance with routines. Practical
biosecurity routines that are attainable is necessary; the en-
demic status means that theoretical policies that are not
implementable will quickly be revealed by continuous
outbreaks.
In conclusion, at first, the study farm appeared to have the
biosecurity measures in place to prevent an ASF outbreak on
the farm, despite being located in an endemic region.
However, the study shows that in-depth, practical knowledge
in many areas is required in order to succeed with pig farming
in this setting without introducing ASF. More specifically, a
high level of awareness about the surrounding circumstances
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and the required biosecurity is fundamental. In addition, em-
phasis must be put on effective, feasible, and vigilant mainte-
nance of biosecurity routines.
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